Trump’s Possible Return Raises Concerns and Opportunities for Korean Security

With the United States increasingly focusing its efforts on containing China, the likelihood of “managing” rather than “solving” the North Korean nuclear issue is growing day by day.

There are rising concerns that should Donald Trump return to the White House, he might engage in negotiations for nuclear arms reduction with North Korea. Such negotiations could potentially be seen as acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, which would signify the failure of the non-proliferation diplomacy pursued for over three decades.

However, the U.S. approach to arms reduction is seen as having significant security implications. Achieving a nuclear balance is a prerequisite for arms reduction, and this could potentially strengthen the argument for requesting the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.

Cha Du Hyun, a senior research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, expressed at an experts’ forum hosted by the Peace Foundation on the 11th, titled ‘2024 International Political Outlook,’ that “nuclear arms reduction negotiations begin with the recognition of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state.” Should former President Trump secure re-election and pursue arms reduction talks with North Korea, “we would have a basis for this.”

Cha further explained, “To initiate nuclear arms reduction talks, we need to establish a balance of nuclear power, which would enable us to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons (on the Korean Peninsula) and share the associated costs.” He noted that the Trump administration may have more flexibility in this area than the current Biden administration.

Hong Hyun Ik, a senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute who formerly served as the director of the National Diplomatic Academy, stressed the importance of national security and advocated for “conditional tactical nuclear redeployment.” He proposed bringing back U.S. tactical nuclear weapons as part of achieving nuclear balance on the Korean Peninsula, with the ultimate goal of negotiating mutual withdrawal and disposal.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ⓒKremlin/AP/Newsis

As North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats continue to escalate, there is a growing chorus in Washington advocating for arms reduction negotiations, cutting across political affiliations. Controversy emerged in October of the preceding year when Bonnie Jenkins, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, publicly voiced her opinions. Although the Biden administration swiftly responded, there’s a sense that the possibility of renewed discussions on this issue could arise at any time.

In particular, it is essential to consider various scenarios in light of the potential return to power of former President Trump, who prioritized “America First.”

For instance, while the Biden administration has emphasized the importance of adhering to the norms of the non-proliferation regime and views the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons as entirely implausible, the Trump administration could take a different approach, focusing on reducing threats to the U.S. mainland and controlling costs, i.e., assessing the benefits.

The Taegukgi and the Stars and Stripes flags hanging at the US Embassy in Jongno-gu, Seoul / Newsis

Above all, there is a growing consensus that we must reevaluate the fundamental “starting point” of North Korean policy in anticipation of various potential outcomes in the future. It is argued that we should prioritize swift preparatory actions for effective countermeasures rather than clinging to moral superiority in dealing with North Korea.

Hong expressed his view, saying, “While we can’t officially acknowledge North Korea’s status as a nuclear-armed state, we must recognize the undeniable fact that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons.” He emphasized that North Korea has amassed a substantial number of nuclear weapons, yet South Korea continues to adhere to the declaration of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

He asked, “How senseless is this?” and continued, “Other countries may perceive South Korea as naïve. North Korea violated the declaration of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula long ago, developed and deployed nuclear weapons, and even threatened to use them against South Korea. So, why are we still holding onto this declaration?”

Senior Research Fellow Cha also echoed the sentiment, suggesting that it is time to abandon the declaration of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and that “the provisions, particularly the withdrawal clause, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be seriously reconsidered.” This implies a need to explore measures related to ‘acquiring potential nuclear capabilities’ beneath the surface.

He stressed, “There have been significant changes in the situation since last year’s Washington Declaration,” and added, “It is our responsibility to urge the U.S. to adopt more advanced measures than those outlined in the Washington Declaration.”

Given North Korea’s declaration of ‘irreversible nuclear possession,’ its characterization of inter-Korean relations as a ‘state of war,’ and its threats to use nuclear weapons against Seoul and occupy South Korea, it is argued that clear and decisive measures to bolster deterrence are essential.