War With South Korea Unlikely? Examining North Korea’s Economic Shifts

Last December, the remarks on Kim Jong Un’s “war readiness” that began in earnest from the 9th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) escalated in intensity with the new year, continuing with military provocations accordingly. In response, few domestic and foreign experts are predicting the possibility of war.

Kim Jong Un has officially ordered preparations for a major incident (war), including the mobilization of nuclear forces in the event of emergencies, to conquer the entire territory of South Korea. Already last August, Kim Jong Un visited the General Staff Training Site of the Korean People’s Army and presented a step-by-step process for the goal of occupying the entire territory of South Korea. However, the military weapons used for the three war execution processes below are all missiles (including artillery shells).

▶Severe damage to the enemy’s war potential and the enemy’s war command center at the beginning of the operation (Paralysis of command and communication means)

▶Destruction of the enemy’s central military command center and essential military facilities ▶Simultaneous high-intensity attacks on critical facilities causing socio-political and economic chaos

The reason why North Korea continues to fire medium and short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles into the East and West Seas and submarine-launched cruise missiles since the New Year is precisely here. This is where we can interpret that the North Korean military is meticulously preparing for war.

However, looking at “the Local Development 20×10 Policy” that North Korea has put forward as the most core economic policy in 2024, we can find a different aspect. This policy plans to select 20 cities and counties yearly and build local industrial factories to develop all regions evenly within ten years.

The 20 cities and counties selected this year have already been revealed (refer to the magnifying glass of Rodong Sinmun on February 3). Rodong Sinmun’s article on the 3rd page on February 6 (Youths in Gangwon Province Volunteer in Difficult and Hard Sectors of Socialist Construction) introduced that more than 60 youths in Gangwon Province volunteered for local construction and rural construction as an “effort mobilization.” Even though it’s not 600, but 60, looking at the report in the Rodong Sinmun, it seems to be a sign for other youths in the province to follow.

Since each provincial party committee is responsible for executing “the Local Development 20×10 Policy”, mobilizing local youths for labor securement is essential. Not only that, but the support of military forces is also necessary. In this regard, last January, at the Enlarged Meeting of Political Bureau, Kim Jong Un personally signed and directly delivered to the Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Army the order of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party of Korea on mobilizing the units of the People’s Army for the struggle to enforce the decision of the 19th enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea to cause a local industrial revolution.

Although the Rodong Sinmun has not yet reported on the support of military forces, likely, each province is cautiously approaching the issue of military support. North Korea has an army unit stationed in each province, usually at the corps level. The corps force is roughly 100,000, including two infantry divisions, armored, artillery, engineering, and air units.

The 9th Corps is stationed in Hamgyongbuk-do (Cheongjin), the 7th Corps in Hamgyongnam-do (Hamhung), the 10th Corps in Yanggang-do (Hyesan), the 6th Corps in Jagang-do (Ganggye), the 8th Corps in Pyonganbuk-do (Yeomju), the 11th Corps in Pyongannam-do (Deokcheon), the 2nd Corps in Hwanghaebuk-do (Pyeongsan), the 4th Corps is in Hwanghaenam-do (Haeju), and the 1st and 5th Corps respectively are in Gangwon-do (Hoeyang, Pyeongchang), and the 3rd Corps in Nampo Special City.

The military forces stationed in each province will be mobilized to construct local (light) industrial factories selected in each city and county selected in each province and may already be in progress. North Korea is promoting this local development policy as the most revolutionary policy and a century-old aspiration in the 80-year history of the party and the 75-year history of the Republic, so the party, government, and military will cooperate and concentrate all their efforts to achieve the goal.

Considering that the command of the Ministry of National Defense is included as a promotion member of the “Non-permanent Central Promotion Committee for the Local Development 20×10 Policy” at the level of the Central Party, it seems that the commanders of each Corps would have participated as promotion members in the “Non-permanent Provincial Promotion Committee for the Local Development 20×10” organized in each province.

Military forces in the economic sector cannot be mobilized in an emergency preparing for war. From this point of view, the probability of war does not seem very high.