Amid the global manifestation of the “Trump Risk,” the worst-case scenario is being discussed in South Korea. It says that South Korea could face an overwhelming risk if former U.S. President Donald Trump wins the U.S. election in November. There are two main concerns.
One is the prediction that Trump would return to summit talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, effectively giving up on denuclearization and tacitly accepting North Korea’s nuclear armament while entering arms control negotiations. Given that North Korea declared the “end of denuclearization” by legislating an “irreversible nuclear state,” and the U.S. has been talking about arms control, such a scenario cannot be ruled out.
Another concern is that Trump might demand a significant increase in defense contribution from South Korea, threatening to suspend U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, halt the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, and even withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea. This scenario can be anticipated considering the actions of the first Trump administration and recent comments from Trump and his former aides.
How the Yoon Suk Yeol government will respond to these two scenarios is also crucial. The Yoon government will face a severe dilemma between U.S.-South Korea relations and domestic political terrain.
Domestically, there will be strong opposition to the North Korean nuclear arms control model, which would be seen as accepting North Korea’s nuclear armament. This will be fiercely rejected by the conservative base supporting the Yoon government.
The conservative base will vehemently argue that South Korea should maintain the U.S.-South Korea alliance and prevent the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, even if it includes the increased defense contribution. However, how the overall public opinion will react to this is uncertain, especially considering that South Korea has already significantly increased its defense contribution, and the burden is substantial.
It’s also important to note that the two scenarios mentioned are closely linked. Suppose a meeting between Kim Jong Un and Trump takes place. In that case, a freeze on North Korea’s nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs, a halt to U.S.-South Korea (and Japan) joint military exercises and U.S. strategic asset deployment, and some easing of sanctions against North Korea will likely be discussed.
Trump will boast that such a deal would prevent North Korea from advancing its ICBMs, thus making the U.S. safer, preventing a Korean war that can be spread to a third world war, and gaining an advantage in competition with China and Russia through improved U.S.-North Korea relations. From Kim Jong Un’s perspective, it’s worth considering as it would address some of the hostile U.S. policies that North Korea has discussed.
If Trump moves toward accepting a limited nuclear capability for North Korea and weakening the U.S.-South Korea joint defense system, including extended deterrence, and Kim Jong Un responds to it, there will be a substantial rise in calls for independent nuclear armament in South Korea, warning that “the worst-case scenario is approaching.”
Primarily, those viewing Trump’s return, who is indifferent to the nuclear non-proliferation system and strongly believes in “taking care of your security,” as an opportunity to push for nuclear armament, will raise their voices. This implies that the “blessing in disguise” theory in nuclear armament could gain momentum.
However, there are more matters we need to consider. Whether the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea is Trump’s true intention or a lever to pressure for a significant increase in defense contribution, the likelihood of the withdrawal becoming a reality is almost zero. This is because it is inevitable that, as during the first period of the Trump administration, the U.S. Congress will unanimously include clauses in the National Defense Authorization Act that prohibit the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and their reduction.
This trend can also be seen in the law enacted by the U.S. Congress last December, which stipulates that if the President attempts to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), he must obtain the consent of two-thirds of the Senate.
Also, it is necessary to recognize that independent nuclear armament is not as easy as it seems. In relation to this, President Yoon Suk Yeol said in a New Year’s interview broadcast on KBS on the 7th, “Given our scientific and technological capabilities, it wouldn’t take long if we decided to develop nuclear weapons.”
Although his remark assumes that nuclear armament is not in the national interest, it is also detached from reality. Whether it’s the methods with highly enriched uranium or plutonium, it will take several years. This entails a “temporal mismatch.” In other words, even if South Korea starts developing nuclear weapons under the tacit approval of the second Trump administration, there is always a possibility that the next U.S. administration could change its mind.
This means that wisdom in dealing with the “Trump Risk” should be made by calmness. We should be wary of both the fear that U.S. forces in South Korea could withdraw and the complacency that we can easily arm ourselves with nuclear weapons. We also need to calmly consider whether the arms control model is the worst-case scenario.
The best-case scenario for the reality of the Korean Peninsula would be a peace regime, denuclearization, the recovery and development of inter-Korean relations, and normalization of North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-Japan relations. However, this scenario became impossible for a considerable period. On the other hand, the worst-case scenario is war. Although the possibility is low, we cannot rule out the risk, which is the reality of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, we need to consider a second best and a second worst. I think pushing for independent nuclear armament corresponds to the second worst. And I believe the arms control model could be the second best.
One reason can be found in some domestic inconsistencies. Some people call North Korea’s possession of ICBMs a “game changer” that could deter U.S. intervention in a crisis and promote North Korea’s communist unification of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, they say that arms control or nuclear disarmament negotiations, which accept North Korea’s nuclear possession, are the “worst-case scenario” that we cannot accept.
However, freezing or partially reducing North Korea’s advanced nuclear program, including ICBMs, is the same as weakening or removing North Korea’s deterrent against the U.S. in the case of an event on the Korean Peninsula. This means that while the “visibility” of extended deterrence may decrease if large-scale U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets are halted as a reciprocal measure for limiting North Korea’s nuclear program, its “stability” could increase.
The relative advantages of the arms control model are not limited to this. Institutionalizing the “double suspension” can significantly help overcome the reality that the crisis on the Korean Peninsula is becoming the “new normal.” Also, fewer nuclear weapons in North Korea are better than more.
Above all, arms control intends to prevent accidental clashes and escalation due to human misjudgment, misidentification, and machine malfunction by maintaining the balance of military power at as low a level as possible, which can greatly contribute to preventing the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula. It’s also worth noting that the arms control model effectively counters Trump’s insatiable demand for a significant increase in defense contribution.
The arms control model is an alternative we should publicize and pursue, regardless of whether Trump returns to power. The independent nuclear armament theory may seem simple. Still, when you see the inside, it is complicated, and there is a high probability that it will not be a self-defensive measure but a self-inflicting one. On the other hand, while the arms control theory may be complex and unsatisfactory, it has a relatively high possibility of realization and holds the potential to create a better state than the present and foreseeable future.
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